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CONSIDERING DEMOCRACY “AN „UNREALISTIC‟ ALTERNATIVE”: THE 
RESULTS OF THE 1954 AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN GUATEMALA 
 
Mark Viskocil (Department of Psychology) 
Matthew Loayza, Faculty Mentor (Department of History) 
 
 
 
 
Guatemalan political elites have traditionally resorted to violence and repression in order 
to suppress social reform movements. In 1944, a group of middle-class reformers, 
including army captain Jacobo Arbenz, spearheaded a revolution that replaced dictator 
Jorge Ubico and began instituting genuine democratic reforms. The new civilian 
president, Juan Arevalo, sponsored new economic and political reforms intended to 
benefit the rural poor that constituted two-thirds of the Guatemalan population. Six years 
later, the revolution continued with the election of Arbenz, who promised to continue the 
efforts of his predecessor. However, U.S. officials, viewing developments in Guatemala 
through a Cold War prism, came to see Arbenz as a communist subjugating Guatemala 
and turning it into a Soviet proxy state. In 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his 
advisors responded by approving and implementing a Central Intelligence Agency plan to 
overthrow Arbenz and replace him with a counter-revolutionary leader, Colonel Carlos 
Castillo Armas. This paper examines the results of the 1954 American intervention, why 
it ultimately failed and why historians have come to view it as a mistake. It is based on 
relevant secondary literature and original U.S. government sources, including Department 
of State and Central Intelligence Agency telegrams, correspondence and National 
Intelligence Estimates. 
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Considering Democracy “An „Unrealistic‟ Alternative”: The Results of the 1954 
American Intervention in Guatemala 
 
Driving a dilapidated station wagon and wearing a leather jacket over his 
checkered shirt, Lieutenant Carlos Enrique Castillo Armas led his rebel troops across the 
Honduran border into Guatemala on June 18th, 1954, to overthrow the popularly elected, 
progressive government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Accompanied by only 450 
soldiers, Armas nevertheless succeeded, thanks to the assistance of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the United States government. Unfortunately, the long-term 
consequences of the decision to overthrow Arbenz were disastrous, as Armas and his 
successors inflicted 35 years of severe political repression that left hundreds of thousands 
of Guatemalan citizens dead. During the civil war, American officials felt that 
authoritarian, non-democratic governments were appropriate for Guatemalan citizens and 
continued to support violent military dictatorships. Through original government and 
relevant secondary sources, this belief is discarded. The American intervention in 
Guatemala ultimately failed and historians have come to view it as a mistake. 
The Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department, by 1954, believed 
they achieved a great victory against communism by ousting Arbenz from power. The 
covert operation to do this, PBSUCCESS, had two main goals: “1. To remove covertly, 
and without bloodshed if possible, the menace of the present Communist-controlled 
government of Guatemala and 2. To install and sustain, covertly, a pro-US government in 
Guatemala.”1 PBSUCCESS attained both goals-Arbenz capitulated on June 27th. 
 
In an attempt to salvage ten years of economic, political and social progress 
initiated by the 1944 revolution (in which Arbenz spearheaded the overthrow of the 
1 Nick Cullather, Secr et Histo r y: T he CI A‟s Cla ssi fied Acco unt o f its Op er atio n s in Guate mala, 1 9 5 2 -1954 
(California: Stanford University Press, 2006), 152. 
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highly repressive dictator Jorge Ubico Castaneda), Arbenz handed the presidency to 
Colonel Carlos Enrique Diaz, but former bureau chief Enno Hobbing of Time Paris 
remarked “Colonel, you‟re just not convenient for the requirements of American foreign 
policy.”2 Pressured by Hobbing, John Doherty (CIA station chief) and John E. Peurifoy 
(American Ambassador to Guatemala) to step aside, Colonel Diaz complied and on July 
7th, 1954, Castillo Armas became president.3 
Although U.S. officials hoped that Castillo Armas would govern as a centrist, the 
new Guatemalan leader immediately began securing power for himself. His security 
forces-led by the highly unpopular Jose Bernabe Linares-banned all literature deemed 
inappropriate, while Armas “disfranchised illiterates (two-thirds of the electorate), 
cancelled land reforms, outlawed all political parties, labor confederations and peasant 
organizations...finally, he decreed a „political statute‟ that voided the 1945 constitution, 
giving him complete executive and legislative authority.”4 
 
Playing off President Dwight David Eisenhower‟s anti-communism, Castillo 
Armas requested significant amounts of monetary and financial aid from the United 
States, but his inability to be fiscally responsible quickly became apparent, as his 
government was almost broke a year later. This was partially due to government 
corruption, such as handing out corn importing licenses for a $25,000 kickback during 
the corn famine of 1955.5 When critics raised their voices, Armas sent his police force to 
 
silence them. 
 
 
 
 
2 Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Story of the American Coup in Guatemala 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 206. 
3 Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1982), 177. 
4 Cullather, Secret History, 113. 
5 Ibid., 115. 
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That same year, Castillo Armas displayed his financial dependence on the United 
States by requesting $260 million in aid-an amount so high it even surprised Thomas 
Mann of the State Department, who quickly denied the request.6 Armas stated that $60 
million of the aid would go towards a national road project, but the State Department felt 
that acquiescing to his expensive appeals would encourage other financially dependent 
countries in Latin America to follow suit with their own high dollar requests and as 
historian Nick Cullather concludes, “by the end of the year, it was apparent that each 
country had entirely unrealistic expectations of the other.”7 
United States officials were dismayed by Castillo Armas‟ lack of financial 
accountability, but the National Security Council nevertheless decided to grant a loan for 
$53 million on May 20th, 1955, because the collapse of the Guatemalan government 
would have been an enormous embarrassment for the American one.8 Vice President 
Richard Milhous Nixon stated that abandoning “the first government in history resulting 
from an overthrow of a Communist regime...will discourage oppressed peoples 
everywhere in the world and would reflect unpardonable inaction on the part of the US 
Government.”9 CIA Chief of Special Research Staff, Dana B. Durand, agreed and wrote 
CIA director Allen Welsh Dulles, asserting that “the downfall of the Castillo Armas 
 
 
6 Department of State Memorandum, Norman Armour to Henry Holland, January 25, 1955, from John 
Glennon, ed., “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South 
America, Volume VII,” Document 21, 59, United States Department of State, available from 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0093.jpg; Internet; accessed March 1, 2008. 
7 Cullather, Secret History, 114. 
8 Department of State Memorandum, Henry Holland to Herbert Hoover, Jr., May 20, 1955, from John 
Glennon, ed., “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South 
America, Volume VII,” Document 30, 80, United States Department of State, available from 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0114.jpg; Internet; accessed March 1, 2008. 
See also Cullather, page 115. 
9 Department of State Telegram, Richard Nixon to John Dulles, February 15, 1955, from John Glennon, 
ed., “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South American, 
Volume VII,” Document 24, 66-67, United States Department of State, available from 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0100.jpg; Internet; accessed March 1, 2008. 
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regime would be a major blow to US prestige and a powerful propaganda theme for 
International Communism.”10 
To prevent the downfall of the Castillo Armas regime, historians Max Gordon and 
Robert J. Alexander stated that the United States government drastically increased its aid 
to Guatemala: “American assistance, which had totaled only $600,000 during the entire 
revolutionary era of 1944-1954, soon reached a level of $45 million annually.”11 In the 
first three years of the Armas presidency, the American government gave his 
administration $80 million, almost all in the form of grants that did not have to be paid 
back. In fiscal year 1956-57 alone, the United States gave Armas $36 million. In 
comparison, the amount equaled a fourth of the aid sent to the entire nation of India.12 
A July, 1955 National Intelligence Estimate (high level, interdepartmental and 
authoritative reports from the intelligence divisions of the Department of State, CIA, 
Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff and others who appraise vital foreign policy problems 
and present them to the president, his appropriate cabinet level officers and the National 
Security Council for evaluation) explained another key reason for the substantial 
spending increase: “Most politically conscious Guatemalans believe that the US planned 
and underwrote the 1954 revolution, and therefore has a continuing responsibility for the 
success or failure of the present government.”13 
 
 
 
 
10 CIA Memorandum, Dana Durand to Allen Dulles, June 19, 1956, from John Glennon, ed., “Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South America, Volume VII,” 
Document 43, 121, United States Department of State, available from 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0155.jpg; Internet; accessed March 2, 2008. 
11 Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 233. 
12 Ibid., 232-233. 
13 IAC National Intelligence Estimate 82-55, Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, “Probable Developments in Guatemala,” July 26, 1955, from John Glennon, ed., “Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South America, Volume VII,” 
Document 35, 94, United States Department of State, available from http:// 
images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0128.jpg; Internet; accessed March 1, 2008. 
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No amount of money could have brought stability to Guatemala, because the CIA 
had replaced a progressive and reformist Arbenz government with an incompetent 
military dictatorship. During a February 1955 conversation with Henry F. Holland 
(Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs), Castillo Armas elaborated on 
his administration‟s inability to successfully lead Guatemala without American direction. 
Armas voiced his concerns about his inexperienced and incapable government and he 
even admitted to Holland that “he himself was poorly prepared to cope with many of his 
problems and that he desperately needed advice and guidance” from the United States.14 
 
The Office of National Estimates (the directors of interdepartmental National Intelligence 
Estimates working groups) in the Central Intelligence Agency concurred with Holland, 
expressing fears that “Castillo may have damaged his potential capacity for leadership by 
excessive reliance on US advice and aid.”15 
By January, 1955, Castillo Armas was frustrated by his inability to implement 
 
public works projects and effectively deal with agrarian reform, labor issues and many 
other pressing matters. The American Ambassador to Guatemala, Norman Armour, 
informed Washington that Armas blamed the U.S. Embassy for the delays in starting 
financial and technical aid programs and had actually accused the Embassy of “ulterior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 Department of State Memorandum, Conversation between Henry Holland and Castillo Armas, February 
14, 1955, from John Glennon, ed., “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: 
Central and South America, Volume VII,” Document 23, 63, United States Department of State, available 
from http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0097.jpg; Internet; accessed March 1, 
2008. 
15 IAC National Intelligence Estimate 82-55, Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, “Probable Developments in Guatemala,” July 26, 1955, from John Glennon, ed., “Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South America, Volume VII,” 
Document 35, 104, United States Department of State, available from http:// 
images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0138.jpg; Internet; accessed March 2, 2008. 
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motives and conspiracies with real and fancied opposition elements.”16 Armour depicted 
Armas as completely incompetent, noting that “There are moments when he seems 
almost pathetic. He must literally be led by the hand step by step.”17 
Castillo Armas‟ shortcomings frustrated not only U.S. officials, but also his 
Liberation army-who had previously fought by his side during the overthrow of President 
Arbenz, but were now growing impatient. On August 29th, 1954, a cable from the CIA 
station in Guatemala reported that the members of Armas‟ army had been living on $18 
for two months and were being “fed through charity.” CIA officials added that although 
“Calligeris (Armas) had collected more than $200,000 for aid to army of liberation...these 
funds have been spent on other „confidential‟ matters. Funds embarked by Arbenz govt 
for Congressional expenditure have also been spent for intelligence activities by 
Calligeris!”18 
The telegram proceeds to state that thirteen government officials were attempting 
to resign from office in mass protest against Armas‟ overall conduct in handling political 
affairs, but were retained by an individual whose name remains classified. The cable 
continues by saying “[name not declassified] has consistently prevented these 
resignations but bluntly stated today that continuance of irresponsible activities by 
Calligeris will force him to permit the resignations of these individuals and the opening 
of a strong political campaign against Calligeris.”19 
 
 
16 Department of State Telegram, Norman Armour to (name omitted), January 25, 1955, from John 
Glennon, ed., “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South 
America, Volume VII,” Document 22, 62, United States Department of State, available from 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0096.jpg; Internet; accessed March 1, 2008. 
17 Ibid. 
18 CIA Telegram, (name omitted) to (name omitted), August 29, 1954, “Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Guatemala 1952-1954,” Document 285, United States Department of State, available from 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ike/guat/20181.htm; internet; accessed December 22, 2007. 
19 Ibid. 
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The irresponsible activities of the Castillo Armas regime included reversing the 
social reforms of the Arbenz presidency, including a major agrarian reform bill that 
Arbenz had submitted to the congress on May 10th, 1952, in hopes of lifting the poor 
from their poverty-stricken existence. The poor consisted mainly of descendants from the 
ancient Mayan civilization-the Mayan Indians-who composed two-thirds of Guatemala‟s 
population.20 In 1952, the Mayan Indians had a 90-99 percent illiteracy rate, a 60 percent 
infant mortality rate and malnutrition in which measles, parasites and the whooping 
cough thrived; moreover, the Mayan population subsisted on a per-capita purchasing 
power that “amounted to about $1 per year.”21 
The provisions of this bill, Decree 900, declared that the state would expropriate 
all uncultivated land in private estates of more than 672 acres, as well as idle land in 
estates between 224 and 672 acres if less than two thirds of the acreage was under 
cultivation. Decree 900 added that the government owned Fincas Nacionales (state- 
owned landed estates) would be entirely parceled out.22 All other estates were to be left 
alone. The idle, uncultivated land would be redistributed to the poor peasants who had 
been economically and often legally enslaved to work it. 
Decree 900 was a modest reform program that expropriated land from those who 
could easily afford to go without it...and were not using it. As historian Richard 
Immerman noted, “the thirty-two largest fincas totaled 1,719,740 acres, of which 
1,575,181 acres were not under cultivation...Consequently, the land which was 
expropriated came primarily from the 1,059 properties whose average size was 4,300 
 
 
20 Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, 23. 
21 Ibid., 24, 29. 
22 Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 150. 
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acres.”23 All of the estates were compensated at a rate of 3-5 percent in agrarian bonds 
that matured in twenty-five years and the value of the expropriated land was determined 
by the amount the owners declared on their tax returns prior to May 10, 1952.24 
Choosing to present an unbiased model of equality, Arbenz‟ reform was far less 
confiscatory than previous ones in Europe and far more restrained than either the 
Mexican reform before it or the Cuban one after it.25 As further legitimacy to its modesty, 
the United States had already implemented similar agrarian programs in Formosa 
(Taiwan) and Japan, which led U.S. aid officials and the United Nations‟ Food and 
Agriculture Organizations‟ senior members to consider Decree 900 “constructive and 
democratic in its aims.”26 
Ratified on June 17th, 1952, Decree 900 became law and Arbenz immediately 
 
sought to implement it. He employed reforms to provide Guatemala‟s citizens with 
literacy, credit and agricultural tech programs that would presumably help Guatemala‟s 
peasants utilize the newly learned methods of farming so they could benefit from their 
labors. Technical assistance began when Arbenz created the Oficina de Programas de 
Produccion Agricola, which used proletarian terms to explain how to increase 
productivity and decrease chances of economic ruin.27 The literacy campaign was put in 
motion through the two largest labor and peasant unions, the Confederacion Nacional 
Campesina de Guatemala (CNCG) and the Confederacion General de Trabajodores de 
Guatemala (CGTG), while the line of credit was offered after Arbenz established the 
National Agricultural Bank in 1953-in the following month alone it approved over $2.5 
 
 
23 Immerman, 65. 
24 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 151. 
25 Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, 65. 
26 Cullather, Secret History, 22. 
27 Gleijeses, 160. 
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million in loans, giving on average $188 to each individual.28 This gave the standard 
Mayan much more purchasing power than the dollar per year they were used to. 
By the end of Arbenz‟ presidency, Decree 900 expropriated roughly 1,657,659 
acres of land, which averaged out to 10.5 acres per individual-giving approximately 
100,000 Indian families, or about 500,000 individuals, cultivatable land that was 
primarily being unused.29 Almost overnight, Jacobo Arbenz had brought some relief to 
one-sixth of the Guatemalan population and “for the first time since the Spanish 
conquest, the government returned land to the Indians.”30 
Unfortunately, the Indians subsistence was irrelevant to Castillo Armas. His close 
aide, Captain Antonio Montenegro, stated that Armas accomplished a “Herculean feat” 
during his rule after the coup: “all but two hundred of the „squatters‟-the beneficiaries of 
Decree 900-had been chased off the land they had received under Arbenz.”31 In the first 
year and a half after taking office, Armas had driven over ninety-nine percent of the 
Indians off the land they received under Arbenz.32 
Immediately after seizing power and ordering the agrarian statute that legalized 
the removal of the “squatters,” Castillo Armas demanded the abolition of all political 
parties.33 National Intelligence Estimate 82-55 states that he also strengthened his 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, 66. 
29 Ibid., 66. 
30 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 160. 
31 Ibid., 381. 
32 Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 233. 
33 IAC National Intelligence Estimate 82-55, Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, “Probable Developments in Guatemala,” July 26, 1955, from John Glennon, ed., “Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South America, Volume VII,” 
Document 35, 92, United States Department of State, available from http:// 
images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0126.jpg; Internet; accessed March 2, 2008. 
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authority by allowing the government‟s assembly to hold “virtually no legislative 
powers,” ensuring that its sole function was to draft a new constitution.34 
However, by July of 1955, Castillo Armas had created the official National 
Democratic Movement (MDN) to serve as the government‟s legitimate political faction. 
The parties‟ proclaimed middle of the road mission statement quickly attracted 144 
people “representing all shades of non-Communist political beliefs” and the members of 
the Committee of Anti-Communist University Students (CEUA).35 The party appeared 
doomed from the start to the United States Intelligence community, who argued that “it is 
improbable that such diverse elements can be held together,” seeing as how the “hybrid 
character of the MDN is already the target of considerable criticism.”36 Nonetheless, 
Armas‟ anti-communist congressional party was the only party allowed to provide 
nominees for seats to the assembly.37 
Following the advice of the CIA and the State Department, Castillo Armas moved 
against Guatemalan leftists, creating the National Committee of Defense Against 
Communism and the Preventive Penal Law Against Communism, which “established the 
death penalty for a series of „crimes‟ that could be construed as „sabotage,‟ including 
many labor union activities.”38 In addition, Armas gave the National Committee the 
ability to meet in secret and brand anyone a communist, the authority to randomly arrest 
and hold suspected communists for six months without legal defense or appeal, and the 
authorization to prevent them from occupying public office-the committee‟s ambition 
 
 
 
 
34 Ibid., 93. 
35 Ibid., 100. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 233. 
38 Ibid., 221. 
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allowed for it to have, by November 21, 1954, “some 72,000 persons on file and was 
aiming to list 200,000 in all.”39 
From the start, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and American Ambassador 
Peurifoy began cracking down on Guatemalan communism by providing their own list 
and demanding that those contained within it be instantly assassinated.40 Immediately 
after the fall of Arbenz, Peurifoy visited interim president Colonel Enrique Diaz. 
According to Arbenz‟ Foreign Minister, Guillermo Toriello, Peurifoy brandished a long 
list containing leaders‟ names and required Diaz to shoot them within twenty-four hours. 
“That‟s all, but why?‟ Diaz asked. „Because they‟re communists,‟ replied Peurifoy.” 
When Diaz refused to participate, Peurifoy explained to him that it would be better, then, 
to have the American flag flying over Guatemala‟s Presidential Palace.41 
Castillo Armas shared the virulent anti-communism of his patrons and upon 
 
taking office, immediately began subjugating unions and effectively silencing labor 
opposition so harshly that “the labor movement was virtually destroyed.” The July, 1955 
National Intelligence Estimate states that while Arbenz had championed the cause of 
labor, Armas viewed them as “objects of official suspicion” and the “efforts by 
employers to negate the benefits granted to labor by the previous (Arbenz) regime had 
increased unemployment and intensified labor‟s feeling of insecurity and resentment.”42 
 
 
 
 
39 Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 221. 
40 Department of State Telegram, John Peurifoy to John Dulles, June 28, 1954, “Foreign Relations of the 
United States, Guatemala 1952-1954,” Document 82, United States Department of State, available from 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ike/iv/20212.htm; Internet; accessed December 20, 2007. See also 
Schlesinger and Kinzer, 208. 
41 Schlesinger and Kinzer, 207-208. 
42 IAC National Intelligence Estimate 82-55, Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, “Probable Developments in Guatemala,” July 26, 1955, from John Glennon, ed., “Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South America, Volume VII,” 
Document 35, 97, United States Department of State, available from http:// 
images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0131.jpg; Internet; accessed March 3, 2008. 
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Guatemalan employees vented their frustration with Castillo Armas during the 
1956 May Day rally when workers disgusted with the anti-union laws taunted 
government speakers off stage. Alarmed by the protests, Armas declared a state of siege 
and ordered his forces to “impede, suppress or suspend strikes of any nature,” because the 
communists were plotting conspiracies and it “has become indispensable to adopt severe 
and drastic means of repressing it.”43 In response, university students organized mass 
 
demonstrations against his government. The protests disrupted a number of cities and 
Armas angrily answered back by having thirty student leaders expelled from the 
country.44 By June, 1956, Armas had finally began to decrease his grip over the labor 
unions, but they continued to be allowed only on farms employing more than 250 people- 
leaving most employees with little or no representation.45 
The thirty university students were fortunate that they were only expelled, as 
Castillo Armas was content with and often used extreme violence as an indiscriminate 
political tool. In September 1952, Jacob R. Seekford, the pseudonym for a U.S. official 
whose name remains classified and identity continues to be undisclosed, informed the 
CIA‟s Chief of Western Hemisphere, Joseph Caldwell King, that Armas and Dominican 
dictator Rafael Trujillo had come to an agreement. Trujillo would support the overthrow 
of President Arbenz if Armas would execute four Santo Dominican men living in 
Guatemala. Armas responded by saying he “would be glad to carry out the executive 
action,” but informed Trujillo that it had to wait due to security reasons-Armas pointed 
 
 
43 Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, 235. 
44 Ibid. 
45 CIA Memorandum, Dana Durand to Allen Dulles, June 19, 1956, from John Glennon, ed., “Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South America, Volume VII,” 
Document 43, 121, United States Department of State, available from 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0155.jpg; Internet; accessed March 2, 2008. 
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out “that his own plans included similar action and that special squads were being 
designated.”46 He then ensured Trujillo that the four men would soon be executed. 
A year before the May Day rally, in January 1955, Castillo Armas‟ administration 
proclaimed that it had unearthed a “pseudo-Communist plot” being planned by regular 
army officers. Taking exceptionally drastic measures at repressing the dissidents, the 
government executed six of the men and banished several leading officers, in which 
Armas rewarded his Liberation Army officers by conveniently placing them in the newly 
vacant positions.47 
On June 23rd, 1956, Castillo Armas employed a Law of Public Order State of 
Alarm, after growing rumors circulated that “communists and leftists” were plotting 
against the government and planning “disturbances” for the 24th or 25th. As a result, 
constitutional guarantees were temporarily suspended and all demonstrations were 
prohibited. On June 24th, the students and their associates held the protests in Guatemala 
City anyways, and of the 300 attending, 50 were taken to jail by the police.48 
The following day, several hundred students attended a demonstration led by anti- 
government speakers infuriated with the previous days‟ arrests. Persuaded by the orators, 
the students began a march for the Presidential Palace to protest the detentions, but were 
confronted by three cars-each carrying six men-before they arrived. The government 
 
 
46 CIA Telegram, Jacob Seekford to Joseph King, September 18, 1952, “Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Guatemala 1952-1954,” Document 18, United States Department of State, available from 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/ike/guat/20195.htm; Internet; accessed January 31, 2007. 
47 IAC National Intelligence Estimate 82-55, Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, “Probable Developments in Guatemala,” July 26, 1955, from John Glennon, ed., “Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South America, Volume VII,” 
Document 35, 93, United States Department of State, available from http:// 
images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0127.jpg; Internet; accessed March 2, 2008. 
48 Department of State Memorandum, Henry Holland to John Dulles, June 26, 1956, from John Glennon, 
ed., “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South America, 
Volume VII,” Document 45, 123, United States Department of State, available from 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0157.jpg; Internet; accessed March 3, 2008. 
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agents initially fired their machine guns into the air, but then turned them onto the crowd 
of student protesters which killed six and wounded many more. Armas responded by 
declaring another state of siege and subsequently suspending all civil liberties.49 
U.S. Ambassador Edward Sparks attempted to impress upon Castillo Armas “the 
importance of publicizing, with supporting evidence, the events as part of a communist 
plot.”50 The United States Information Agency (USIA) concurred and immediately sent 
instructions to their agents on how to handle the situation, while Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs, Henry F. Holland, urged Armas to make a public 
address on or near the 2nd anniversary of the liberation that would make a permanent 
impact upon the population by arguing that “those who died did so not because of 
government tyranny, but because of cynical communist political maneuverings.” Holland 
also counseled the president on the need for restraint in responding to demonstrators, 
pointing out that “tear gas was effective and infinitely preferable to bullets.”51 
The USIA found scapegoating communism so effective that the agency used it 
again after Castillo Armas was assassinated by a member of the presidential guard on 
July 26th, 1957.52 When Secretary of State Dulles learned the USIA was unable to 
definitely tie the assassination to communists, he “took strong exception” to the 
uncertainty and began educating them by stating “the fact that the assassin was himself a 
 
 
 
49 Department of State Memorandum, Henry Holland to John Dulles, June 26, 1956, from John Glennon, 
ed., “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South America, 
Volume VII,” Document 45, 123, United States Department of State, available from 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0157.jpg; Internet; accessed March 3, 2008. 
50 Cullather, Secret History, 115. 
51 Department of State Memorandum, Conversation between Jose Luis Cruz Salazar, Henry Holland and 
Bayard King, June 29, 1956, from John Glennon, ed., “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. 
American republics: Central and South America, Volume VII,” Document 47, 126, United States 
Department of State, available from http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0160.jpg; 
Internet; accessed March 3, 2008. 
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Communist should permit an emphasis on the Communist connection, especially because 
Communists have a fundamental motivation which leads them to violent revolution.”53 
Secretary Dulles felt that absolute proof was unnecessary when laying blame on 
communists and taking the hint, the Secretary‟s staff contacted the Bureau of Inter 
American Affairs (ARA) and asked them to “continue to exploit as fully as possible in 
our publicity the Communist implication in the assassination of the President of 
Guatemala.”54 
Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, was more skeptical than his 
brother in accepting the communist affiliation in the Castillo Armas assassination. During 
the National Security Council discussion on August 1st, Dulles suggested that other 
rightist parties may have been involved and proceeded to note his reasons for doubting a 
communist connection. Dulles stated that immediately after the assassination, the 
Guatemalan news had been shut down for twelve hours to keep the murder secret and all 
witnesses had become inaccessible-showing signs of advance planning. He continued by 
saying the communists in Guatemala seemed to be content, but taken aback by Armas‟ 
death and he attested that an assassin would not have held incriminating documents on 
his person. Dulles questioned the “extraordinary readiness of the Guatemalan 
Government to handle the situation” and then bluntly stated that “a genuine Communist 
coup would not have been handled in this way.”55 
 
 
 
53 Department of State Note, Secretary of State (John Dulles) Staff meeting, August 7, 1957, from John 
Glennon, ed., “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957. American republics: Central and South 
America, Volume VII,” Document 60, 146, United States Department of State, available from 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs2/1955-57v07/M/0180.jpg; Internet; accessed March 3, 2008. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Intelligence Advisory Committee Note, Staff meeting headed by Allen Dulles and supplemented by 
Hugh Cumming, July 30, 1957, from John Glennon, ed., “Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955- 
1957. American republics: Central and South America, Volume VII,” Documents 58-59, pps143-145, 
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Hugh Smith Cumming, Jr., a Foreign Service Officer and later the Director of 
Intelligence and Research for the State Department, backed Allen Dulles at the discussion 
by informing the council that other Department of State members held reservations about 
believing the Guatemalan Government‟s story of blaming the communists. He noted that 
it was unusual for “organized Communists to go in for assassination unless the specific 
gain will counter the adverse reaction” and that “Communists usually do not leave such a 
recognizable record as in this case.”56 Differences aside, the American heads of state had 
 
a common concern in wondering what would happen to Guatemala without Castillo 
Armas at the helm. 
The Office of National Estimates could not have predicted or underestimated 
Guatemala‟s future any more precisely than it did in July, 1955: “If the Castillo 
government should be overthrown, Guatemala would probably experience a protracted 
period of political instability.”57 Following the death of Castillo Armas, Ortiz Passarelli 
(the centrist candidate) defeated the reactionary Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, resulting in 
Ydigoras‟ followers rioting. The army subsequently seized power and held another 
election in 1958, voting Ydigoras in. He immediately declared another state of siege and 
assumed full power, but his “increasingly autocratic rule” led to a revolt by junior 
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military officers in 1960.58 After the revolt failed, the four leftist groups went 
underground and befriended Castro‟s Cuba; they became four guerrilla groups-including 
the Guerrilla Army of the Poor-and led armed insurrections against the government of 
Guatemala for the next thirty-five years. 
Ydigoras was consequently removed in a March 1963 coup by the Minister of 
National Defense, Colonel Enrique Peralta Azurdia. Peralta‟s justification for the removal 
was Ydigoras‟ mishandling of former president Juan Jose Arevalo Bermej‟s candidacy in 
the 1963 elections. Peralta made clear that the military‟s intention was to retain “direct 
control of the caretaker government by decreeing that the Minister of National Defense 
would also serve as Chief of Government.”59 The coup conveniently placed Peralta in 
both positions. 
Although the Guatemalan political atmosphere was unstable, the repression was 
not. As the guerrilla groups emerged in eastern Guatemala in the 1960‟s, the United 
States sent military advisors and weapons to aid the government. In 1966-1967, President 
Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro gave his security forces free reign in return for their 
military support. The result was mass kidnappings, torture and summary executions that 
left 10,000 peasants dead.60 State Department Intelligence noted in 1967 that a large 
 
number of the deaths resulted from “over-zealous clandestine counter-insurgent activities 
by the security forces and their associates.” The Guatemalan government, State 
Department officials reported, had formed a special commando unit which carried out 
torture, executions, abductions, bombings and assassinations of both “real and alleged 
 
 
58 Department of State Background Note, August, 2007, from Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, 
“Guatemala: Profile,” History 1944-1986, United States Department of State, available from 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm; Internet; accessed December 19, 2007. 
59 Cullather, Secret History, 169. 
60 Ibid., 116. 
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communists.” The security forces had autonomy to suppress dissent because the enemies 
of the state were defined so vaguely.61 
In the 1970‟s, the repressive state of siege continued indefinitely as President 
Carlos Arana Osorio‟s forces rounded up and killed suspected communists-In January 
1971, two-hundred oppositionists were killed in the San Marcos Department alone.62 In 
the first three years of Arana‟s presidency, government-sponsored death squads, military 
personnel and police forces became so indiscriminate in their extermination efforts 
against leftist guerillas that investigative reporter Jack Anderson of the Washington Post 
printed “the estimates of victims, many of whose mutilated corpses made identification 
impossible, range from 3,500 to 15,000.”63 
In the 1980‟s, the civil war proceeded to intensify and President Romeo Lucas 
Garcia made it clear to U.S. Army General Vernon Walters that “his government will 
continue as before-the repression will continue.”64 President Lucas was not about to 
discuss the United State‟s newfound Human Rights concerns. Lucas wanted the 
communist, left-wing guerillas and everyone associated with them exterminated. In 
February 1982, his army went into the El Quiche Department and burned entire towns 
that supposedly supported the guerrilla army of the poor. Lucas‟s army had orders to burn 
all abandoned towns and destroy any others assumed to be those of guerrilla conspirators. 
61 Department of State Intelligence Note, Thomas Hughes to Dean Rusk, October 23, 1967, from George 
Washington University, “Guatemala: A Counter-Insurgency Running Wild?” Document 4, 1-2, National 
Security Archives, available from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB11/docs/04-01.gif; 
Internet; accessed December 22, 2007. 
62 DIA Intelligence Bulletin, (name omitted) to (name omitted), January 12, 1971, from George 
Washington University, “Guatemalan Antiterrorist Campaign,” Document 6, National Security Archive, 
available from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB11/docs/06-01.gif; Internet; accessed 
December 22, 2007. 
63 Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, page 249. 
64 Department of State Memorandum, Robert Jacobs to Luigi Einaudi, October 5, 1981, from George 
Washington University, “Guatemala: What Next?” Document 13, National Security Archives, available 
from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB11/docs/13-01.gif; Internet; accessed December 
22, 2007. 
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Most of the towns belonged to Indian peasants who fearfully fled to the hills-leaving 
thousands with no home to come back to. Its success appeared to be limited to the 
destruction of several towns and “the killing of Indian collaborators and sympathizers.”65 
The hunt for guerrilla conspirators by the Guatemalan army in the later 70‟s and early 
80‟s left more than 100,000 citizens dead.66 
The military assumed that anyone who wanted social change were communists 
who must be silenced. The Guatemalan Death Squad Dossier-an internal military log 
smuggled from Guatemala‟s army intelligence files and given to human rights advocates 
in February, 1999-provides a glimpse into the thirty-five year civil war that occurred after 
the fall of the Arbenz government. The dossier (with pictures and descriptions of the 
victims) documents the abduction, torture and assassination of 183 citizens who 
“disappeared” between August 1983 and March 1985.67 
When the killings became too pronounced in the 1980‟s and human rights 
activists began to have their voices heard, the American government “tried to shift the 
blame from the army to the guerrillas or to fictive civilian death squads.”68 Rosario 
Godoy, along with her brother and two-year old son, disappeared on April 4th, 1985. 
 
When the three were found dead at the bottom of a ravine outside Guatemala City, the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65 CIA Secret Cable, (name deleted) to (name deleted), February, 1982, “Counterinsurgency Operations in 
El Quiche,” from George Washington University, Document 14, 1-3, National Security Archive, available 
from http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB11/docs/14-01.gif; Internet; accessed December 
22, 2007. 
66 Cullather, Secret History, xxviii. 
67 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 15, Press Release, May 20, 1999, from George 
Washington University, “Guatemalan Death Squad Dossier,” National Security Archives, available from 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB15/press.html; Internet; accessed February 25, 2007. 
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country had lost its only human rights leader. Suspicion of foul play began to grow after 
it was noted that the fingernails of Rosario‟s two-year old son had been pulled out.69 
President Ronald Reagan‟s Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Affairs, Elliott Abrams, attempted to downplay the incident by stating “So 
far there is no evidence indicating other than the deaths were due to an accident”- the 
army stated that it was a car accident as well, while the Archbishop called it “triple 
murder.”70 
By the end of the thirty-five year civil war, the Guatemalan security forces had 
 
killed 160,000 people and “40,000 disappeared-93 percent at the hands of the 
Guatemalan security forces.”71 The U.S. allowed these events to take place and even 
encouraged them at times: the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research 
Thomas L. Hughes stated that “the counter-insurgency operations...have been so 
successful,” after security forces kidnapped, tortured and executed hundreds in 1967.72 
As the killings swelled to unparalleled heights in the early 1980‟s under General Efrain 
Rios Montt, President Ronald Reagan declared to the world that the general had gotten a 
“bum rap on human rights.”73 
The reformist leader, Jacobo Arbenz, had witnessed the suffering and repression 
of Guatemala‟s citizens his entire life and as president, tried to foster a more humane 
Guatemalan society by implementing social and political legislation in an attempt to 
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71 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 15, Press Release, May 20, 1999, from George 
Washington University, “Guatemalan Death Squad Dossier,” National Security Archives, available from 
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quickly alleviate the destitution of the country‟s majority population. Because Arbenz 
befriended and did not persecute Guatemalan communists and leftist labor leaders, U.S. 
officials concluded that communism in Guatemala was a rampant extension of Russia. 
The U.S. government felt that pondering over whether or not Arbenz was truly a 
communist was unnecessary-at the very least, his administration and closest advisors 
posed a threat to U.S. National security. After all, they had former Ambassador to 
Guatemala Richard Patterson Jr.‟s Duck test: “suppose you see a bird walking around in a 
farm yard. This bird wears no label that says „duck.‟ But the bird certainly looks like a 
duck...he goes to the pond...and swims like a duck...he opens his beak and quacks like a 
duck. Well, by this time you have probably reached the conclusion that the bird is a duck, 
whether he‟s wearing a label or not.”74 
 
Ambassador Patterson and the United States government were right. President 
Arbenz was a communist and officially joined the PGT in 1957, three years after his 
capitulation from the Guatemalan presidency. Arbenz‟ wife, Maria, stated that “Jacobo 
was convinced that the triumph of communism in the world was inevitable and desirable. 
The march of history was toward communism. Capitalism was doomed.”75 But Jacobo 
Arbenz‟ reasons for embracing communism were altruistic, extremely compassionate and 
due to conditions within Guatemala, not because of any Moscow intervention. 
The rigid policies of the United States government and Guatemala‟s upper elite 
provided Arbenz with few alternatives to communism, as their history of economic and 
political repression fostered the suffering of the majority of Guatemala‟s population. In 
communism, Arbenz found a way to diminish the hopelessness that pervaded the country. 
 
 
74 Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, 102. 
75 Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, 147. 
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Guatemalan Interior Minister, Augusto Charnaud MacDonald, said that Arbenz found the 
answers to his countries problems in the Soviet Union, which symbolized “something 
new in the world...it was governed by a class which had been ruthlessly exploited; it had 
defeated illiteracy and raised the standard of living in a very short time; it had never 
harmed Guatemala.”76 
Nick Cullather asserts that American officials successfully deposed a government, 
 
but failed to install a stable, democratic one.77 Piero Gleijeses, the Professor of American 
Foreign Policy in the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins 
University, states that the Guatemala of today continues to be a “sick society-the tortures, 
the disappearances, and the killings fester.”78 The State Department‟s secret report, 
Guatemala’s Disappeared: 1977-1986, confirms both Cullather and Gleijeses‟ view on 
the conditions that have saturated Guatemala since the ousting of President Arbenz. It 
blatantly states that “Guatemala is a violent society” and “Statistics on homicides reveal 
that Guatemala has a murder rate almost equivalent to that of the rest of Latin America 
combined.”79 
The secret report continues by discussing how violence is used as a political tool 
and is consciously accepted, how security forces and paramilitary groups are responsible 
for most kidnappings of rural social workers, medical personnel and campesinos (the 
Indian peasants) and how personal enemies, business competitors and military 
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commissioners accuse the innocent of being insurgents and get them disappeared for 
financial gain or to “eliminate personal and ideological opponents.”80 
The State Department official who authored the report-and whose name is not 
declassified-accepts department blame by stating “we have failed in the past to 
adequately grasp the magnitude of the problem.”81 Dated March 28th, 1986, the internal 
report provides primary documentation that explores the extensive history of Guatemalan 
violence against the innocent. On a brighter note, it offers optimism by stating 
“Economic development and judicial reform, hopefully, will eventually lead to a 
reduction in the rate of disappearances.”82 
The irony of the statement lies in the fact that U.S. officials helped create the 
violent repression they later tried to avoid. Deposing President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman 
was a mistake that fostered unnecessary bloodshed and by removing him, the United 
States government removed innovative economic, judicial, social and political 
progressions-progressions that cultivated an atmosphere of aspirations. Instead of 
continued Guatemalan advancement, the long-term consequences of the American 
Intervention are death and destruction and the current despair was summed up over two 
decades ago, when a regretful U.S. State Department official said “What we‟d give to 
have an Arbenz now, we are going to have to invent one, but all the candidates are 
dead.”83 
 
 
 
80 Department of State Secret Report. (name omitted) to (name omitted), March 28, 1986, from George 
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